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Abstract We study the problem of allocating Electric Vehicles (EVs) to
charging stations and scheduling their charging. We develop offline and on-
line solutions that treat EV users as self-interested agents that aim to max-
imise their profit and minimise the impact on their schedule. We formulate the
problem of the optimal EV to charging station allocation as a Mixed Integer
Programming (MIP) one and we propose two pricing mechanisms: A fixed-
price one, and another that is based on the well known Vickrey-Clark-Groves
(VCG) mechanism. Later, we develop online solutions that incrementally call
the MIP-based algorithm. We empirically evaluate our mechanisms and we ob-
serve that both scale well. Moreover, the VCG mechanism services on average
1.5% more EVs than the fixed-price one. In addition, when the stations get
congested, VCG leads to higher prices for the EVs and higher profit for the
stations, but lower utility for the EVs. However, we theoretically prove that
the VCG mechanism guarantees truthful reporting of the EVs’ preferences.
In contrast, the fixed-price one is vulnerable to agents’ strategic behaviour as
non-truthful EVs can charge in place of truthful ones. Finally, we observe that
the online algorithms are on average at 98% of the optimal in EV satisfaction.
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1 Introduction
The increasingly negative impact of climate change on society has forced sev-
eral countries to instigate national plans to reduce carbon emissions [1]. The
electrification of transport is one of the main pathways to significantly reduce
CO2 emissions. However, the successful introduction of EVs into the market
lies upon the acceptance of the new type of vehicle by the customers. Cur-
rently, three main problems prevent the spread of EVs: 1) the relatively small
range, 2) the long charging times and the unavailability of charging stations,
and 3) the higher cost of buying an EV compared to a conventional car. Given
that these limitations demand several years before they can potentially be re-
moved, ways of making EVs attractive to customers given the current situation
must be developed. For example, the coordinated charging of many EVs given
the available stations and the power grid constraints, as well as the fair pricing
of the electricity can soften limitations 2 and 3.
In this paper we study a municipality-based urban EV charging setting
where EVs drive across a city converge to parking stations in the center and
need to charge. The EVs are modelled as self-interested agents that want to
charge their battery given a set of preferences and constraints, while from the
system’s perspective, the maximization of EV satisfaction and the balanced
distribution of them across the charging stations and within each station are
the objectives. At the same time, the system needs to make a profit and be
economically sustainable, but maximizing the profit is not the goal. Hence, it
is crucial to leverage advances in decentralized control and mechanism design
to coordinate demand and supply to mitigate the impact on the grid.
In order to allocate the EVs to charging points we propose optimal offline
solutions, and sub-optimal online ones. In all cases, market-based techniques
are being used. In the case of the offline solutions, the EVs report their pref-
erences (e.g., energy demand, time of arrival) a day ahead and the system
selects to charge the EVs with the higher valuations given the charging station
and network constraints. The valuation is a metric of how much the agents
want the energy units (i.e., the maximum price that the agent would be will-
ing to pay for an amount of energy). After the allocation has been decided,
two pricing mechanisms are used. In the first one, each agent pays a fixed
price for each unit of electricity, while in the second one, each agent pays a
price calculated by the well-known Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism
[26], [4], [11]. In the case of the online solutions, EV requests are collected by
the system over time and the offline algorithms are executed periodically, at
pre-defined points over the day, in order to decide the EV-to-charging-station
allocation (i.e., a number of requests are being collected and then the schedul-
ing algorithm is called. Thus, each EV waits until the next execution of the
scheduling algorithm to learn its allocation).
In this paper, we build on the works by Rigas et al. [19] and Stein et al.
[23]. In particular, [19] applies congestion pricing across nodes in a network
of charging stations to incentivise EV-agents to charge in stations with low
congestion. At the same time, [23] propose a mechanism for allocating electric
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power units to self-interested agents, aiming to maximise social welfare of
the agents. In this paper, we propose a market-based EV to charging station
scheduling scheme. This scheme maximizes social welfare from the side of the
EVs and guarantees truthful reporting of their preferences, while it minimises
charging imbalance both across the charging stations, as well as within each
station. Our contributions to the state of the art are:
1. We propose an optimal centralized offline solution using Mixed Integer
Programming (MIP) to solve the problem of allocating EVs to charging
stations. In doing so, we take into consideration the cost of the electricity,
but also an imbalance cost which represents the difference of the actual
demand compared to the expected one.
2. We propose two different pricing mechanisms, and we theoretically prove
that for one of them truthful reporting of EV preferences is the dominant
strategy for all agents.
3. We propose online algorithms that incrementally execute the optimal offline
algorithms and achieve near-optimal performance.
4. We experimentally evaluate our algorithms in a setting using real locations
of charging stations in Athens, Greece and we show that they achieve high
EV satisfaction and have good scalability (i.e., tenths of charging stations
and hundreds of EVs).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 the related work
is discussed, in Section 3 the problem is formally defined and in Section 4 the
optimal EV to charging station allocation scheme is presented. In Section 5 the
two pricing mechanisms are presented, and in Section 6 the online variation of
the problem is described. Finally, Section 7 presents the empirical evaluation
and Section 8 concludes and presents ideas for future work.
2 Related work
Market-based techniques to schedule the charging of EVs across stations have
already been applied in a number of occasions [18]. Initial work by Carama-
nis and Foster [3], investigate market-based control techniques in collectives of
EVs for load balancing and to provide regulation services that allow renewable
energy sources to be integrated.1 Specifically, they develop a bidding strategy,
using stochastic dynamic programming techniques, for the aggregator to ac-
count for uncertain demand from the EVs while maximizing regulation service
revenues (by efficiently absorbing unpredictable surges of wind energy into
the EV batteries). In [5] they further develop a new bidding strategy (using
mathematical programming) for the EV aggregator to operate in hour-ahead
(real time) markets.2
1 Regulation service corrects for short-term changes in electricity use that might affect
the stability of the power system. It helps match generation and load and adjusts generation
output to maintain the desired frequency.
2 Real-Time Market is a spot market in which current prices are calculated at five-minute
intervals based on actual grid operating conditions.
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In the same vein, González Vayá and Andersson [25] use MIP techniques to
bid in a day-ahead market having as an objective to minimise charging costs,
while satisfying the EVs’ demand for electricity. In [10], the same authors go
a step further, and they model the bidding strategy as a two-level problem,
where the upper-level is in charge of minimizing the aggregator’s charging cost
(a set of EVs is represented by an aggregator), while the lower-level represents
the market clearing (the price on which electricity is sold), where the bids of
other participants are not known in advance. Additionally, Yang et al. [28] pro-
pose a centralized charging scheduling framework which also considers the load
mismatch risk between the day-ahead and the real-time market.3 The frame-
work is based on the day-ahead prices and on statistical information of the
EVs’ driving patterns, while the risk-aware day-ahead scheduling is modeled
as a two stage stochastic linear problem which is solved using the L-shaped
method [24]. Moreover, Soares et al. [21] present a two-stage stochastic pro-
gramming approach which uses dynamic pricing for the EVs, but also takes
into consideration the uncertainty in energy demand from the EVs and supply
from the renewable sources. Finally, Perez-Diaz et al. [17] consider a scenario
where a number of independent and self-interested EV aggregators participate
in the day-ahead market to purchase energy for their clients’ driving needs. In
this scenario, independent bidding can drive prices up unnecessarily, resulting
in increased electricity costs for all participants. Inter-aggregator cooperation
can mitigate this by producing coordinated bids. However, this is challenging
due to the self-interested nature of the aggregators, who may try to manip-
ulate the system in order to obtain personal benefit. In order to overcome
this issue, the authors employ techniques from mechanism design to develop a
coordination mechanism which incentivises self-interested EV aggregators to
report their energy requirements truthfully to a third-party coordinator. This
coordinator is then able to employ a day-ahead bidding algorithm to optimise
the global bids on their behalf.
In the works presented so far, an aggregator collects the preferences of a
number of EVs and then it bids in the market trying to satisfy the demand.
Aside from such mechanisms, others have also been developed to manage con-
gestion, caused by the simultaneous charging of many EVs, at a local level
where each EV is considered separately. A common characteristic in all these
mechanisms is that the incentives and allocations are set to ensure the agents
have, as their best strategy, to reveal their true preferences for charging times
and reserve prices. In particular, we note the work of [23], [6] and [7] that use
mechanism design techniques to incentivise self-interested EV agents (that
hold their owners’ utility function) to book charging slots in order to achieve
system-wide objectives (e.g., cost reduction, network stability). Specifically,
[23] propose a mechanism for allocating electric power units to self-interested
3 An entity (e.g., an EV aggregator) buys electricity in the day ahead market based on
predictions on the next day’s consumption. Then, in the real time market it can buy (or
sell) electricity to cover the actual demand. However, real-time markets are more expensive
compared to day-ahead ones, and therefore, the amount of energy bought in the real-time
market must be minimised.
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agents, aiming to maximize the social welfare of the agents. In order to gen-
erate efficient electricity unit allocation decisions, the authors use a modified
version of the Consensus algorithm. Moreover, they use the concept of pre-
commitment (the mechanism pledges that it will charge the EV by its depar-
ture time, but has the flexibility to choose when and at what rate the charging
will take place), they prove that their mechanism incentivises truthful report-
ing of the preferences of the agents. Instead, in [6], agents state time windows
within which they will be available to charge, and bid for units of electricity
in a periodic multi-unit auction (one auction per time step). In order to en-
sure truthfulness, the authors developed a mechanism that occasionally leaves
units of electricity unallocated, even if there is demand for them. Moreover,
in [7], a two-sided market (between charging points and EVs) is proposed. In
particular, the agents report their preferences and their value for the electric-
ity and the charging points report their availability and costs, and then they
are allocated the slot that maximizes the difference between their value and
the sellers’ cost (i.e., in case the agent’s value is greater than the cost).
In addition, congestion pricing has been used to schedule EVs in such a way
so that the load and the congestion to be minimised. For example, [9] develop
a decentralized solution where EVs react to a price signal broadcast by the
utility a day-ahead. In more detail, two alternative tariffs are explored, one
where the same price profile applies system-wide, and another where differ-
ent prices can be defined at different nodes. By shifting their charging cycles
to minimise cost (solving a constrained Optimal Power Flow problem), the
EVs also reduce congestion on the distribution network. This solution mainly
balances schedules at individual nodes rather than across the network. How-
ever, Rigas et al. [19] and Karfopoulos and Hatziargyriou [14] present solutions
that balance the charging across a set of stations. In particular, [19] applies
congestion pricing across nodes in the network using pricing functions that
are demand-dependent. In this way, the EVs (acting as self-interested agents),
automatically schedule themselves to minimise congestion and cost across the
network but also at individual charging points. Moreover, [14] formulate the
problem as a single-objective, non-cooperative, dynamic game and apply a
number of price signals across a set of regions of a distribution network. The
authors prove that a Nash-equilibrium can be achieved under the assumption
that the EV agents are (weakly) coupled.
Ghosh and Aggarwal [8] present an online pricing mechanism where each
charging station decides on the prices that will charge to each EV based on
the available energy and the time of the day. The authors show that when the
mechanism knows the true valuations of the agents it maximizes social welfare
(i.e., utilities for the EVs and profit for the stations). However, they do not
guarantee truthtelling from the side of the EVs.
In contrast to the works presented so far, in this paper we propose an
algorithm that assigns EVs to charging stations, which apart from the EV
satisfaction also takes into consideration the balanced charging of EVs across
the stations. Moreover, we develop two pricing mechanisms where one of them
makes truthtelling the dominant strategy for all EVs. In other words we achieve
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both load management and social welfare maximization given the set of EV-
agents and the available resources. According to the best of our knowledge,
this combination is studied for the first time in the EV-related literature [18].
The model of our problem is described in the next section.
3 Problem definition
In our model, we define a set of locations l ∈ L, L = Lp
⋃
Lp¯ that can either
be charging stations (i.e., Lp) or not (i.e., Lp¯). Based on this, we define a
transport network as a graph G = (E,L) with nodes L and edges E, where
e ∈ E represents the roads and l ∈ L represents the junctions of the road
network. We define discrete time points t ∈ T , T ⊆ N, while we denote the set
of EVs as a ∈ A.
Now, ∀l ∈ Lp there are a number of charging slots sl ∈ N. Each charging
station l has a charging rate, cl ∈ R
+
0 (i.e., energy units/time point transferred
from a charger to an EV), and all charging stations have a fixed cost costelecl ∈
N to pay to the electricity provider for each unit of electricity. Thus, we define
an allocation matrix chargea,l,t ∈ {0, 1} to represent EV a is charging at
charging station l at time point t. Moreover, each charging station has an
expected demand deml,t ∈ N for each time point, which is assumed to be
agreed with the electricity provider in advance. In so doing, a monetary penalty
costimbll,t
costimbll,t =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a
chargea,l,t − deml,t
∣∣∣∣∣× costimbl (1)
is applied to the stations whenever the actual demand varies from the expected
one. The term imbalance is a measure of how much the actual demand deviates
from the expected one. This imbalance cost is calculated as the sum of the
absolute value of the difference between the sum of EVs charging at each time
point and the expected demand dema,l over all charging points multiplied by
a fixed cost (see Equation 1). In other words, the closer the actual demand is
to the expected one, the lower this cost is and therefore the price penalty that
each station will have to pay. Note that such imbalance penalties are common
practice in the energy industry [12], [16], [2]. Henceforth, index a refers to the
EVs, l to the charging stations, and t to the time points.
In this setting, each EV a has a type which is defined by a tuple θa =〈
da, b
max
a , ba,t, l
start
a , t
start
a , l
end
a , τ
prk
a , t
arr
a,l , t
dep
a,l , b
chrg
a , v
elec
a
〉
. In more detail, each
a has a discharge rate da ∈ R
+
0 , a maximum battery capacity b
max
a ∈ R
+
0 , and
a current battery level at time t, ba,t ∈ R
+
0 both measured in kWh. Moreover,
each EV a departs from its source location lstarta at time t
start
a ∈ T and wants
to travel to destination lenda where it needs to park for time τ
prk
a ∈ N. Given
a pair of locations (lstarta , l
end
a ) and the transport network G, the shortest
route, rlstarta ,lenda ∈ Rlstarta ,lenda from the source to the destination is calculated
using Dijkstra’s algorithm (i.e., Rlstarta ,lenda is the set of all possible routes be-
tween points lstarta and l
end
a ). Similarly, the shortest routes rl′,l ∈ Rl′,l from
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the sources to all charging points l ∈ Lp are calculated as well. Every route
rl′,l has a distance δl′,l : Rl′,l → N measured in kilometers, a time to travel
τdrivel′,l : Rl′,l → N, and an amount of energy needed, ǫ
need
l′,l (τ
drive
l′,l , da). Based
on slot availability and on the ability of an EV to reach a charging point
with its initial battery level, a set of valid charging points Γa,t ⊆ Lp is de-
fined. Now, every EV is available to charge between tarra,l = t
start
a + τ
drive
a,l
and tdepa,l = t
arr
a,l + τ
prk
a . Note that τ
drive
a,l is measured based on the distance
to location l divided by an average speed. Each vehicle also needs to charge
a specific amount of energy bchrga ≤ b
max
a at charging point l and it also has
a personal valuation va,l for charging the desired amount of energy at each
charging point.
va,l =
{
veleca − κ
time
a,l , if ba,tdep
a,l
≥ bchrga,l
0, otherwise
(2)
According to Equation 2, a time cost κa,l related to driving to the station
and walking from the station to the final destination is subtracted from the
valuation veleca for charging the desired amount of electricity. Time cost κa,l
actually shows how willing agent a is, to drive to point l and then walk to the
final destination. Note that, the agent has zero valuation for charging less than
bchrga , and valuation va,l for charging equal to or more than b
chrg
a . Moreover,
each agent a receives utility ua,
ua = va,l − pa (3)
where pa ∈ R is a monetary transfer from the EV to the system (i.e., the utility
is a measure of satisfaction for charging the desired amount of electricity). pa
is usually positive, as the EVs pay the charging station for the electricity.
However, in case the charging of an EV leads to lower imbalance cost for the
charging station, the transfer for this EV may be negative (i.e., the EV gets
paid- see Section 5.2).
For an EV to be assigned to a charging station and charge, it has to reveal
its type θa to the system. Then, the system applies an EV to charging station
allocation algorithm to schedule EV charging and uses one of two proposed
pricing mechanisms to calculate the prices for the EVs. Such mechanisms can
be either offline (Section 4), or online (Section 6).
4 Offline scheduling of EVs to charging points
Here, we present a formulation for optimally allocating EVs to charging points.
Thus, we formulate the problem as a Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) one
and we solve it optimally using IBM ILOG CPLEX 12.6.2.
In our formulation we define two decision variables: 1) φa,l ∈ {0, 1} which
indicates whether an agent a is serviced at charging station l and 2) chargea,l,t ∈
{0, 1} which indicates whether agent a is charging at charging station l, at time
point t (at charging rate ca). The objective of this formulation is to maximize
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Equation 4, which means to maximize the sum of the agents’ valuations (i.e.,
charge as many agents as possible at the stations with the lower time cost)
minus the cost for the electricity and minus the imbalance cost for an optimal
allocation X∗ of EVs to charging points. Note that the absolute value in the
objective function is linearized at run time by CPLEX.4 More formally, the
linear program is given by:
Objective function:
F (X∗) =
∑
a
∑
l
va,l × φa,l −
∑
a
∑
l
∑
t
chargea,l,t×
costelectrl −
∑
l
∑
t
costimbll,t (4)
Subject to: ∑
l
φa,l ≤ 1,∀a (5)
barra ≥ ǫ
need
a,l (ra,l, da)× φa,l,∀a,∀l (6)
∑
t≥tarr
a,l
∩t<t
dep
a,l
chargea,l,t ≥
[
bchrga,l /cl
]
× φa,l,∀a,∀l (7)
∑
t<tarr
i,j
∩t≥t
dep
i,j
chargei,j,t = 0,∀i,∀j (8)
∑
t≥tarr
a,l
∩t<t
dep
a,l
chargea,l,t + b
arr
a ≤ b
max
a (9)
∑
a
chargea,l,t ≤ sl,∀l∀t (10)
We detail the key elements of this mathematical program as follows. EV
a will charge at most at one charging station l (Equation 5), and the initial
battery level of each EV must be enough to reach the charging station selected
to charge (Equation 6). In addition, the number of time points that an EV
will be charging must be greater or equal to the energy demand divided by the
charging rate cl at station l (τ
chrg
a,l =
[
bchrga,l /cl
]
) (Equation 7). Moreover, for
all time points before the arrival and after the departure of EV a at charging
station l, no charging must take place (Equation 8), and after the completion of
the charging, the maximum capacity of the EV’s battery must not be exceeded
(Equation 9). Finally, the maximum capacity of each charging station, in terms
of available chargers, must not be violated at any time (Equation 10).
In the next Section, we present two pricing mechanisms for the electricity
that each EV charges.
4 This is usually achieved by adding two extra decision variables and two extra constraints.
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5 Pricing mechanisms
In this section, we present two mechanisms for calculating the price that the
agents will pay for the electricity they will charge according to the scheduling
as presented in the previous section. In the first mechanism, the agents are
assumed to be truthful, while in the second one they may misreport their
types.
In order to evaluate a mechanism, we examine whether a number of prop-
erties hold:
1. Individual Rationality: This means that all agents that are scheduled
to charge have non-negative utility, while the ones that are not scheduled
to charge have zero utility (i.e., ∀a, ua ≥ 0). In our setting, this specifically
means that agents will never pay for the energy more than their valuation.
2. Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility: This means that for
all agents, truthfully reporting their types is the best strategy, no matter
what the other agents do (i.e., ua(θa) ≥ ua(θˆa)). In our setting, this means
that the agents will not end up paying higher prices if they are truthful
regarding their valuations for the energy.
3. Efficiency: A mechanism, such as the one presented in this work is effi-
cient, if in equilibrium it selects a choice X∗ such that it maximizes social
welfare: ∀X∗, F (X∗) ≥ F (X ′∗). In our case, this means that the available
energy units will be charged to the agents with the higher valuations.
4. Budget Balance: This means that the sum of all transfers (i.e., pay-
ments to and from the charging stations) are equal to zero (i.e., budget =∑
a(p
vcg
a − cost
elec
a ) −
∑
l
∑
t(cost
imbl
l,t ) = 0). Weak budget balance means
that budget is non-negative, while no-budget balance means that budget
can get any value. In our setting, this is needed for the sustainability of
the community stations, meaning that the stations should not suffer from
losses but also that maximizing profit is not their goal.
5.1 Cooperative Agents
Initially, we assume that all agents are cooperative (i.e., they report their types
θa truthfully) and we design a fixed price mechanism where the payments of
the agents to the charging company are calculated based on:
pcoopa = (b
chrg
a × cost
elec
l )× (1 + incr) (11)
Based on this equation, each agent pays its energy demand multiplied by the
cost of electricity for each unit of energy increased by a percentage incr ∈ R+
(i.e., this value determines the profit that the charging station will make for
each unit of electricity that sells to each EV. This is actually the usual price
setting mechanism in many markets, where the seller prices a product based
on its cost increased by a fixed percentage). In order to calculate the incr we
find the point where the mechanism becomes sustainable, i.e., stops making
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losses and starts making a small profit (see detailed description in Section 7).
From now on, we will refer to this mechanism as Coop.
The allocation of the agents to charging points takes place based on the
objective function (Equation 4). However, the price to pay is calculated after-
words and the valuation of the agents is not taken into consideration. Thus,
the price to pay can be higher than an agent’s valuation. In this case, the
agent decides not to charge and receives zero utility. For this reason, we con-
clude that the agents’ utilities are always equal or larger than zero and the
mechanism is individually rational.
Under the assumption that all agents are truthful, they will report their
true valuations and for this reason the mechanism would be incentive com-
patible. However, as long as an agent will not get negative utility it has an
incentive to misreport its valuation. For example, assuming that the imbal-
ance cost is equal to zero, and incr = 0.05, if an agent has valuation va,l = 5
but reports v′a,l = 6, and bi ∗ cost
electr
l = 4, the optimizer will schedule this
agent to charge and the price to pay will be pcoopa = 4 + 4 ∗ 0.05 = 4.2. Thus,
the agent will charge with the same price, but it will increase the chances of
being selected instead of another agent that would report its valuation truth-
fully. For this reason, the mechanism is not incentive compatible. This will be
experimentally confirmed in Section 7.4.
Now, in order the mechanism to be efficient, Equation 4 must be maxi-
mized. Under the assumption that all agents are truthful, the optimization
procedure leads to an allocation of EVs to charging points which maximizes
this function. However, in case for some agents the price to pay is higher than
their valuation, these agents will decide not to charge. Thus, some resources
will remain unallocated. Also, the assumption that the agents will be truthful
does not always hold. For these reasons, the mechanism is not efficient.
Finally, in the case where the actual demand is equal to the expected one,
then the mechanism will make a profit as totalCost = b[i] ∗ costelec + 0 and
totalRevenue = bi ∗ (cost
elec + costelec × incr) > totalCost. If the demand
is different than the expected one, then the budget can be either positive or
negative. Only in the case where
∑
l
∑
t(cost
imbl
l,t ) =
∑
i(bi × cost
elec × incr)
the mechanism is budget balanced. Thus, in the general case, the mechanism
is not budget balanced.
In the next section we present an alternative pricing mechanism which
makes truthful reporting of preferences the dominant strategy for all agents.
5.2 Strategic Agents
In the general case, agents would try to misreport their types if they had
an incentive to do so (i.e., achieve higher utility). The mechanism presented
in the previous section, can easily be manipulated if some agents misreport
their type (e.g., report higher valuation). In this section, we present an op-
timal EV to charging station allocation scheme which uses the well known
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [26] [4], [11]. The VCG mechanism
Mechanism Design for Efficient Allocation of EVs to Charging Stations 11
is a generalization of the Vickrey auction where, in the general case, multiple
agents bid for multiple goods of the same type (i.e., combinatorial auction)
and the price to pay for each agent is calculated based on the harm they cause
to the other agents [27]. The main characteristic of this mechanism is that it
is incentive compatible, which means that no agent can benefit by declaring
anything other than its true type. Therefore, this mechanism, assuming that
all agents play their dominant strategies, finds the optimal allocation of the
resources (i.e., electricity units) in terms of social welfare maximization and
then calculates the price that each agent will pay to the mechanism.
In order to calculate the allocation of EVs to charging points, we use the
MIP formulation as described in Section 4. In the end of the optimization
procedure, an optimal allocation X∗ of EVs to charging points is achieved. We
calculate the transfer pvcga (i.e., the price) that EV a will pay to the mechanism
for the energy charged, as follows:
pvcga = (
∑
e∈A
(ve,l(X
∗
−a)− cost
elec
e (X
∗
−a)− cost
imbl
e (X
∗
−a)))−
(
∑
e∈A
(ve,l(X
∗)− costelece (X
∗)− costimble (X
∗))− va,l(X
∗)) =
∑
e∈A
(ve,l(X
∗
−a)− cost
elec
e (X
∗
−a)− cost
imbl
e (X
∗
−a))−
∑
e∈A
(ve,l(X
∗)− costelece (X
∗)− costimble (X
∗)) + va,l(X
∗) (12)
Based on this equation, each agent a will pay its impact on the others (i.e.,
its social cost) added to the cost of electricity it charged and the imbal-
ance cost (i.e., X∗−a denotes the optimal allocation without the existence of
agent a, ve(X
∗) the valuation of agent e based on an optimal allocation X∗,
costelece (X
∗) the electricity cost for agent e based on an allocation X∗ and
costimble (X
∗) the imbalance cost for e based on X∗). In more detail, the first
sum contains the total values and costs for all agents, but in an allocation
where a does not exist. Whereas, the second sum contains the total value of
all agents apart from a and the costs for all agents including a in an allocation
where all agents participate. In all cases, the cost of electricity is fixed (per
unit of energy) for all agents and acts as a reserve value for the charging sta-
tion, while the imbalance cost depends on the demand profile. From now on,
we will refer to this algorithm as VCG.
In contrast to the previous mechanism where agents have an incentive to
lie, here due to the fact that 1) VCG mechanism is used and 2) the types of
the EVs are not interdependent, it is best for the agents to reveal their types
truthfully. In the rest of this section we prove the properties of this mechanism.
Theorem 1 The VCG mechanism for the EV allocation problem is individu-
ally rational.
Proof The result of the optimization procedure is a set of agents selected to
charge A′ ⊆ A : ∀a ∈ A′, va,l − cost
elec
a,l − cost
imbl
l ≥ 0 and an allocation X
∗ to
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charging stations. Now, ∀a ∈ A′, the transfer pvcga from agent a to the system
is given by Equation 12, and the utility of agent a is given by Equation 3
which, based on Equation 12 becomes:
ua = va,l − p
vcg
a = va,l(X
∗)−∑
e∈A′
(ve,l(X
∗
−a)− cost
elec
e (X
∗
−a)− cost
imbl
e (X
∗
−a))+
∑
e∈A′
(ve,l(X
∗)− costelece (X
∗)− costimble (X
∗))− va,l(X
∗) =
∑
e∈A′
(ve(X
∗)− costelece (X
∗)− costimble (X
∗))−
∑
e∈A′
(ve(X
∗
−a)− cost
elec
e (X
∗
−a)− cost
imbl
e (X
∗
−a)) (13)
Now, in order the
∑
e∈A′(ve(X
∗) − coste(X
∗)elec − costimble (X
∗)) to be
greater or equal to
∑
e∈A′(ve(X
∗
−a)−coste(X
∗
−a)
elec−costimble (X
∗
−a) and there-
fore, Equation 14 to be true, the choice-set monotonicity and the no negative
extrnalities properties must hold [20]. Choice-set monotonicity means that by
removing any agent, the mechanism’s set of possible choices weakly decreases.
In our case, this property holds as, if an EV leaves, the mechanism has fewer
choices in scheduling the EV charging. Moreover, the no negative externalities
means that every agent has zero or positive utility for any choice that can be
made without its participation. In our case, this property also hods, as if an
agent does not participate in the mechanism, it gets utility equal to zero. Also,
note that if the second sum was larger than the first one, the optimizer would
not select i to charge in first place. For these reasons, Equation 14 always holds
and the mechanism is individually rational (Equations 15, 16).
∑
e∈A′
(ve(X
∗)− costelece (X
∗)− costimble (X
∗))−
∑
e∈A′
(ve(X
∗
−a)− cost
elec
e (X
∗
−a)− cost
imbl
e (X
∗
−a))
≥ 0,∀a ∈ A′ (14)
ua = 0,∀a /∈ A
′ (15)
ua ≥ 0,∀a ∈ A
′ (16)
We can safely assume that the agent would not lie about the discharging
rate, the maximum battery capacity of the EV, the initial battery level, the
start location and the final destination. The discharging rate and the maximum
battery capacity are considered to be common knowledge. If an agent lies about
its initial battery level, then it reduces the options that the scheduler has to
assign it to a charging station. At the same time, there is no point in lying
Mechanism Design for Efficient Allocation of EVs to Charging Stations 13
about its start and end location as in that case it would have to move to or
from these locations, which could cost the agent more than it would be gaining.
Given these, we can prove incentive compatibility of the mechanism:
Theorem 2 The VCG mechanism for the EV allocation problem is dominant
strategy incentive compatible under the assumption that the system knows the
discharging rate, the maximum battery capacity, the initial location and the
final destination of each EV.
Proof Agents could have an incentive to misreport their energy demand (bchrga,l )
and their valuation for this energy (va,l), the time cost (κa,l), their arrival and
departure times (tarra,l , t
dep
a,l ). We assume that the discharging rate, the maxi-
mum battery capacity of the EV, the initial battery level, the start location
and the final destination are common knowledge to the scheduling centre.
In what follows we will prove incentive compatibility for the agents’ re-
ported type, for an optimal allocation X∗. The utility of agent a, when it
reports its type θa truthfully is
ua = va − (F (X
∗
−a)− F (X
∗) + va) =
va − F (X
∗
−a) + F (X
∗)− va =
= va − F (X
∗
−a) + F−va(X
∗) (17)
while, when agent a reports its type θˆa non-truthfully its utility is
uˆa = va − (F (X
∗
−a)− F (Xˆ
∗) + vˆa) =
va − F (X
∗
−a) + F (Xˆ
∗)− vˆa =
= va − F (X
∗
−a) + F−vˆa(Xˆ
∗) (18)
In this case, the utility is the difference between the true valuation of agent
a and the impact on the other agents based on the non-truthful report of its
type.
The first two terms of Equations 17 and 18 are not affected by the non-
truthful report of the type of agent a (Reminder, F(X*) is the value of the
objective function- Equation 4). Thus, in order to understand whether the
mechanism is incentive compatible, we have to see how the final term can be
affected. In so doing, we evaluate a number of cases:
1. Agent a is non-truthful and charges:
(a) If its report does not affect anyone else, then:
F−vˆa(Xˆ
∗) = F−va(X
∗)− costeleca − cost
imbl
a
< F−va(X
∗) (19)
Thus, uˆa < ua and for this reason agent a has no incentive to lie.
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(b) If its report affects agent b ∈ A : b Ó= a, then:
F−vˆa(Xˆ
∗) = F−va(X
∗)− (vb − cost
elec
b − cost
imbl
b )
− costeleca − cost
imbl
a (20)
Given that vb−cost
elec
b −cost
imbl
b is greater than zero (otherwise b would
not have been selected to charge at first place), F−vˆa(Xˆ
∗) < F−va(X
∗)
and for this reason uˆa < ua. Therefore, a has no incentive to lie. Note
that if this agent’s report affected more than one agent, its loss would
be even greater.
2. Agent a is non-truthful and does not charge. In this case, uˆa = ua = 0.
Thus it doesn’t have an incentive to lie.
Note that if agent a reports tˆarra < t
arr
a or tˆ
dep
a > t
dep
a then the optimizer
could schedule it to charge at time points that it wouldn’t be at the charging
station. Thus, the agent would get less energy compared to its demand and,
therefore zero utility. Also, if agent a reports bˆa < ba, then by default it would
get zero utility. Moreover, if bˆa > ba, the optimization already takes that into
consideration (i.e., Constraint 7). So if an agent would be better off reporting
higher energy demand (as this could decrease the imbalance cost) then the
optimization will do it automatically.
Theorem 3 The VCG mechanism for the EV allocation problem is efficient
(i.e., maximizes social welfare).
Proof In order the mechanism to be efficient, Equation 4 must be maximized.
Indeed, after the optimization procedure, and given that the mechanism is
incentive compatible, the allocation of EVs to charging points leads to the
maximization of this function. Therefore, the allocation is efficient.
Theorem 4 The VCG mechanism for the EV allocation problem is not budget
balanced.
Proof The budget of the mechanism is given by:
budget =
∑
a
(pvcga − cost
elec
a )−
∑
l
∑
t
(costimbll,t ) (21)
In the general case where the actual demand is different from the expected
demand, budget balance cannot be guaranteed. In the case of very low demand,
the stations will have a loss as the income will be low but the imbalance cost
very high. For example, if the expected demand is 2 EVs at each time point,
and no EV arrives to charge, the station will have a loss as it will need to pay
the imbalance cost as calculated from Equation 1. Moreover, given that the
charging of an EV can reduce the imbalance cost, negative transfers are also
possible. In the case where the actual demand is higher than the expected one,
the EVs will have positive transfers to the stations. Thus, our mechanism is
not budget balanced. However, in our setting, although profit maximization is
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not the main objective, this should not be considered a problem, as the aim of
the charging stations should be to make some profit so as to be economically
sustainable.
Now, in the extreme case where the actual demand matches exactly the
expected demand, then costimbla = 0,∀a. In this case, as the charging of any
EV does not affect the charging of another (we assume that the pre-agreed
consumption can always be covered by the station). Thus, the sum of all
transfers from the agents to the stations is equal to the cost of electricity
paid by the stations to the electricity provider (
∑
a(p
vcg
a ) =
∑
a(cost
elec
a ) ⇒
budget = 0). Only in this case, our mechanism is budget-balanced.
6 Online scheduling of EVs to charging points
So far, we assume that the demand becomes known to the system a day ahead.
However, in this section, we present an online version of the EV to charging
station scheduling problem where agents arrive in the system dynamically
over time and need to charge. In so doing, the system collects the requests
from the agents and clears the market at pre-defined points in time similar
to [6]. By market clearing we actually mean that the EVs that have reported
their preferences to the system are considered in the EV to charging station
scheduling (see also Figure 1 and Algorithm 1). In more detail, a sequence
of points tp ∈ T in the day where market clearing takes place are defined.
After each tp the charging scheduling algorithm (Section 4), is executed and
an optimal allocation X∗ is calculated. Later, the price to pay for each EV is
calculated based on either the Coop or the VCG mechanism. Now, for every
p : p > 1, the mechanism makes sure that the already existing schedule of
EVs charging is not affected. This is an important assumption, as it will later
guarantee incentive compatibility from the side of the EVs in the case where
the VCG is used to calculate the prices. Also, note that all EVs that participate
at the market at tp, must have an arrival time t
arr
a < tp.
Algorithm 1 Online EV to charging station scheduling.
Require: A, T , L, θa∀a, deml,t
1: for all p do
2: call offline algorithm for all a ∈ A : tstarta ≤ tp
3: {For the EVs that were scheduled in earlier market clearing, the value of φa,l remains
unchanged. The payments are calculated in the same way as in the offline algorithms.}
4: end for
5: return φa,l
The properties of the VCG mechanism, as these have been described in
the previous section, hold in the online setting as well. However, special no-
tice should be given to the dominant strategy incentive compatibility and the
efficiency:
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Figure 1 Online EV to charging station scheduling
Regarding the incentive compatibility, agents could try to misreport their
arrival time in order to participate in a later market clearing. However, as
agents can report their demand for any time in the day, by delaying the report
they cannot have higher utility. This is due to the following reasons: 1) Given
the imbalance cost, the earlier an agent arrives to the system, the higher the
improvement it causes to the imbalance cost. Thus, the transfer of the agent
to the mechanism could become smaller. 2) If an agent delays the report,
stations can already be highly congested, thus not being able for it to charge.
Therefore, the best strategy for the agents is to report their preferences to the
system the earlier possible time (i.e., the time they decide that they want to
charge).
Moreover, regarding efficiency, the mechanism is efficient for each market
clearing. However, it may not maximize social welfare for the whole set of
agents. This is inevitable due to the fact that the system does not know the
future demand. Thus, agents with possibly low valuations, that have partici-
pated in an early market clearing may have occupied charging slots that could
have later been used by agents with higher valuations.
In the next section, we evaluate our algorithms in a realistic setting and
for a number of problem dimensions.
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7 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate our algorithms using real data regarding locations
of charging stations and numbers of available plugs in Athens, Greece.5 The
EV demand across the stations (and the valuations) is based on observations
of traffic flow from Google maps, and discussions in related works [13], [22]. In
more detail, we evaluate the execution time and scalability (EXP1), the EV
satisfaction (EXP2), the cost for the EVs and profit for the charging stations
(EXP3) and the impact of preferences’ untruthful reporting (EXP4). In so
doing, we use 50 time points, where each one is assumed to be equal to 15
minutes, 10 - 130 EVs and 8 charging stations. The arrival and departure
times of the EVs, the energy demand, the valuation for each energy unit and
the expected demand are drawn from uniform distributions (i.e., tarra : mean =
15, σ = 15, tdepa : mean = T − t
arr
a , b
chrg
a : mean = t
dep
a − (t
dep
a − t
arr
a )/2, σ =
tdepa − t
arr
a )/2, v
′
a,l : mean = 0.5, σ = 0.5 which is then multiplied by the
number of energy units the agent wants to charge va,l = v
′
a,l × b
chrg
a and
deml,t : mean = 2,= 1). Note that the charging rate is fixed to one unit of
energy per time point in all stations and that the desired energy is always
able to be charged in the EV within the available time window. Finally, the
incr value for the Coop mechanism is calculated as follows: An initial value of
0.1% is given to incr and the optimization is executed recursively each time
increasing incr by 0.1%. At each iteration some EVs may leave the system as
the price to pay gets higher than their valuation. The value of incr is fixed
to the one where the mechanism starts making a profit. This procedure was
executed multiple times for different numbers of EVs and the average value
of incr = 2.5% was selected. Finally, the time points at which the scheduling
takes place in the online scenario are tp = {10, 20, 30, 40, 50}. Note that for
each p, requests collected at any t : t ≥ tp−1 and t < tp are considered.
7.1 EXP1: Execution time and scalability
Highly combinatorial problems such as the one we solve here are known to
suffer from high execution times. Thus, it is crucial to evaluate the execution
time of both the offline as well as the online algorithms and for a number of
scenarios (see Figure 2).
In terms of the VCG mechanism, the execution times for both the offline
and the online versions increase quadratically (R2 = 0.898 for the offline and
R2 = 0.998 for the online). For up to 60 EVs, both formulations have execution
times which are well under 30 seconds. However, later the execution time for
the offline version increases rapidly and for 130 EVs it reaches 778 seconds,
while the online algorithm executes in 31 seconds. Note that for the online
version, we present the average execution time for all market clearings for
each number of EVs (reminder: in the online version the scheduling algorithm
5 https://user.fortizo.gr/#/portal/locations.
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Figure 2 Execution times of all algorithms
is called at specific points in time). The online algorithm must calculate a
charging schedule fast, and for this reason the low execution time is crucial for
its usability. For the 130 EVs, the 45 seconds can be considered as an acceptable
value. However, it should be noted that due to the fact that for each market
clearing the EVs that have already been scheduled to charge are also considered
(as a constraint this time), the optimization procedure remains quite complex.
Overall, the second part of the objective function which contains the absolute
value, although it is linearized at run time, it affects the execution time a lot.
As long as the Coop mechanism is concerned, the execution time grows
quadratically for the offline (R2 = 0.85) and the online version (R2 = 0.956).
However, the rate of growth is considerably smaller compared to the equivalent
times of the VCG mechanism. For example, for 130 EVs, the execution time
for the offline version is approximately 38 seconds and for the online one 6.69
seconds. Note that the error bars in all graphs show the standard deviation of
each sample.
7.2 EXP2: EV satisfaction
In terms of the average number of serviced EVs (Figure 3), for up to 100 EVs
on average 85% of all vehicles are charged. However, for more than 80 EVs
more of them remain uncharged, as for example for 130 EVs 81.3% of them
are charged by the VCG offline and 79.6% by the Coop offline. Actually, the
offline mechanisms always lead to slightly higher numbers of serviced EVs.
This was expected due to the fact that when the problem is solved online,
congestion and resource management are not optimal and for this reason some
EVs remain uncharged. When comparing the two mechanisms, VCG always
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Figure 3 Average number of serviced EVs
services slightly more cars than the Coop. This can be explained by the fact
that the Coop does not take into consideration the valuations of the EVs in
setting the prices. Thus, some EVs get higher price than their valuation and
they leave without charging.
The utility of the serviced EVs (Figure 4) increases linearly with the num-
ber of EVs for all mechanisms. Regarding VCG, the utility for the online
version is slightly higher compared to the offline one and especially for set-
tings with more than 100 EVs. This can be explained by the fact that the
offline charges more EVs, thus increasing the competition for the resources,
and for this reason it calculates higher prices for the EVs (i.e., when the num-
ber of EVs to be charged increase, the addition of one EV is more likely to
lead to others not being charged and for this reason the prices calculated by
the VCG mechanism are higher. See also Section 7.3). Also, note that the
rate of increase for the utility of the VCG mechanism, slows down for high
numbers of EVs. This is related to the fact that when the demand for the
resources increases a lot, this mechanism calculates high prices for the agents.
Regarding the Coop, the utility for both variations is almost the same and for
large numbers of EVs higher compared to VCG Offline. However, despite the
fact that the Coop mechanism provides higher utility, it is vulnerable to ma-
nipulation in the case where EVs report their types non-truthfully. Whereas,
VCG cannot be affected from such behaviour, as the EVs would have a loss
any time they report anything other than their true types (see Section 7.4).
7.3 EXP3: Price for the EVs and budget for the system
Regarding the average price that each EV pays to the mechanism (Figure 5),
the VCG offline calculates similar prices compared to the VCG online for small
numbers of EVs, but later the prices increase rapidly. This can be explained
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Figure 4 Average total utility
Figure 5 Average price paid by the EVs
by the fact that for each market clearing the competition for the resources
is smaller as slightly less EVs are charged and for this reason the mechanism
calculates lower prices. In terms of the Coop and given that it is a fixed price
mechanism, the average price mainly depends on the number of serviced EVs.
As long as the profit is concerned (Figure 6), for both mechanisms the
offline variant leads to higher profit. Moreover, when comparing the VCG and
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Figure 6 Total profit for the mechanism
the Coop mechanisms the profit is initially higher for the Coop, but when the
competition for the resources increases a lot (i.e., more than 100 EVs) the VCG
achieves higher profit. The online variants of the mechanisms follow a similar
trend. As was expected, the results related to the profit of the mechanisms
echo those related to the prices paid by the EVs. However, part of the higher
profit of VCG is due to the fact that this mechanism achieves higher reduction
of the imbalance cost. This is so, as in VCG all EVs that are selected to charge
pay prices lower than their valuations and for this reason none of them leaves
the mechanism without charging. However, in the case of Coop, some EVs
leave as the price to pay is higher than their valuation. For this reason the
Coop mechanism pays a higher imbalance cost especially for large numbers of
EVs.
An interesting question is how the revenue changes with the number of
charging stations. As can be seen in Figure 7, in a setting where the number of
EVs is fixed to 80 and the charging stations vary from 6 to 18, the revenue of the
VCG mechanism decreases with the number of stations. This can be explained
by the fact that when the number of stations is small, the competition for the
resources is high and for this reason the mechanism calculates high prices.
However, as the number of the stations increases, the competition decreases
and so do the prices. Interestingly, for more than 14 stations, the revenue
becomes negative. This can be explained by the existence of the imbalance
cost: Given an equal expected demand for each station, when up to 14 of
them exist, the actual demand usually overcomes the expected one. Thus, the
majority of the EVs have a positive transfer and for this reason the profit
for the stations is positive. However, for more than 14 stations, the expected
demand is higher than the actual one, and for this reason the transfers of a
number of EVs are negative (i.e., they receive a payment from the mechanism)
as these EVs reduce the imbalance cost and for this reason their existence has
a positive impact in the system. This finding can be used to decide on the
22 Emmanouil S. Rigas et al.
Figure 7 Total profit - Variable number of stations
optimal number of charging stations for an area or a city. At the same time,
the Coop calculates similar prices for all cases.
7.4 EXP4: Truthful VS non-truthful reporting
In the experiments presented so far, all EVs are assumed to report their types
truthfully. However, this may not be always the case. Thus, here we evaluate
a setting where some EVs report their valuations non-truthfully. By reporting
lower valuation, many of these EVs are not selected to charge and get zero
utility. Thus, it is obviously a negative choice for them and for this reason we
focus in the case where some EVs report higher valuation. In particular, we
assume that 10% of the EVs report 80% higher valuation.6 In this case and as
far as VCG is concerned, the non-truthful EVs have a 9.09% decrease in their
utility despite the fact that 8.69% more of them are selected to charge. This
happens due to the fact that the mechanism calculates higher prices for them.
At the same time, the truthful EVs have a 1.35% decrease in their utility due
to the fact that 0.46% less of them are charged. Thus, in the case of VCG,
the agents do not have an incentive to misreport their valuation. These results
confirm the theoretical evaluation presented in Section 5.2.
In contrast, when the Coop mechanism is used, the non-truthful EVs in-
crease their utility by 6.07% as 10.67% more of them are selected to charge,
while the truthful EVs face a 1.2% decrease in their utility due to the fact that
1.67% less of them are charged. Given this, EVs, which are rational agents,
have an incentive to misreport their valuations. For this reason we further
study the Coop mechanism in a scenario where all EVs lie about their valua-
tions. In this case, the utility of all EVs is reduced by 1.57% due to the fact
that 3, 23% less EVs are charged. Note that, due to the fact that all valuations
shift upwards by 80%, the decrease in the total utility is not very high. Despite
the fact that in Coop when all agents lie they receive a worse utility, and given
6 For this value the liers have been observed to achieve the higher utility in the Coop
mechanism.
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the fact that if only some agents lie the rest receive a worse payoff, the agents
will be locked to the lying strategy, as in the prisoners dilemma game. At the
same time, the profit for the station is increased by 8.57% due to the fact that
the higher valuations give the option to the mechanism to select fewer EVs
but with high valuations and reduce the imbalance cost. However, given the
fact that the municipality stations’ goal is not to maximize profit but social
welfare, there is an incentive to use the VCG mechanism instead of the Coop.
Note that in all cases the statistical significance of the results has been verified
using t-tests.
8 Conclusions and future work
In this work, we presented market-based techniques to solve the problem of
scheduling EVs and allocating them to charging stations. We considered two
approaches, and for each one we considered both the offline and an online
variant. In the first approach we used a fixed price mechanism, while in the
second approach, we used the well known VCG mechanism and we proved
that truthtelling is the dominant strategy. We evaluated our algorithms in a
realistic setting and we observed that both have good scalability as they scale
to hundreds of agents and tenths of charging stations. Moreover, we observed
that the VCG mechanism leads to higher revenue for the stations and lower
utility for the EVs in cases where the stations are highly congested. However,
it is proven to not be vulnerable to agents’ strategic behaviour. Finally, both
approaches achieve approximately 83% serviced EVs.
As far as future work is concerned, we aim to apply online mechanism
design techniques for the same problem, while we also want to add V2G and
V2V energy transfer so as to use the EVs’ batteries as storage devices and
increase energy utilization and customer satisfaction [15]. Moreover, we aim
to use queuing theory in order to add the ability for the EVs to wait in a queue
in the charging stations. Finally, it is crucial to investigate machine learning
techniques in order to achieve good prediction in future demand and minimise
the imbalance cost.
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